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Sangeeta KHORANA & Maria GARCIA*
The European Union (EU) has concluded bilateral trade agreements with Korea, Latin
America, Central America and CARIFORUM states. Using the example of procurement
liberalization commitments undertaken by the EU and partner countries, this article analyses
how conformity between bilateral agreements and the WTO plurilateral Government
Procurement Agreement is likely to promote competition and transparency, and be a stepping
stone to future multilateral liberalization. It argues that liberalization through bilateral
agreements will first, promote and reinforce EU’s prominence in shaping future multilateral
liberalization; second, fulfil EU’s aspiration of playing a leading role in defining the map of
‘global governance’ for future multilateral liberalization.
1 INTRODUCTION
Regional and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are an increasingly
significant feature of world trade.1 Numbers have multiplied in the 2000s given
the impossibility of concluding the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha
Round. In 2006, the European Union’s (EU) trade policy condensed in the
‘Global Europe’ strategy and the follow-up ‘Growth, Jobs and Trade’ (2010),
prioritized new generation FTAs which are ‘comprehensive in scope, provide for
liberalization of substantially all trade […] and go beyond WTO disciplines’.2
Encapsulated in this are dual aims – an interest-led motivation to open markets
and further business opportunities for EU firms;3 and a normative aspiration to
export a preferred model of liberalization, governance and multilateral regulation.
* Dr Sangeeta, Senior Lecturer in Economics Keele Management School, Keele University, Keele
ST5 5 BG, United Kingdom,Tel: +44 1782 733101, Corresponding author: s.khorana@keele.ac.uk;
sangeetakhorana@hotmail.co.uk; Dr Marie Curie Fellow, School of Politics & International
Relations, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, Tel: +44 (0)117 84 68142, Email:
mj_garcia_san@yahoo.es.
1 WTO (2012),World Trade Report 2011, Geneva.
2 European Commission (2006) Global Europe: Competing in the World, 11, trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf (accessed 25 Jun. 2013).
3 Ibid. And European Commission (2010) Report on progress achieved on the Global Europe strategy,
2006-2010, Commission Staff Working document, SEC (2010) 1268/2 (Brussels), http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146941.pdf (accessed 25 Jun. 2013).
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This article deals with the normative aspiration of the EU to incorporate
Government Procurement (GP) provisions in its recent FTAs with Latin American
and Asian states. It addresses how the EU exports its preferred regulatory model
and assesses whether these agreements could foster multilateral convergence in
procurement through a common external governance model. The extension of
EU rules and practices beyond its borders has been captured by the ‘external
governance’ literature,4 which focuses on Europe’s neighbourhood and when third
parties adopt its norms. Wunderlich (2012) highlights that the adoption of EU
rules is determined by competing influence of EU institutional factors, domestic
factors in third parties and the interdependence of external governance providers.5
Esther Barbe et al. (2009) point out that the EU may act more as a transmitter of
rules that have been elaborated in other international fora.6 The case of GP reflects
this duality: the EU transmits multilateral rules, but it is also exporting its preferred
GP model, as its internal procurement model is compatible with, and is aiming to
inform the multilateral setting.Thus, the article argues that the EU’s extension of
GP rules responds to: interest-led motivation to open markets, normative
aspirations and the desire to encourage adoption of multilateral norms, facilitated
by its GP regime where adaptations to a global GP system have already
eventuated.What makes this article topical is that procurement liberalization has
been a contentious issue that emerging and developing states have rejected at the
WTO, and where only limited liberalization exists under the voluntary WTO
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).
The structure of this article is as follows: Section II discusses the rationale for
FTAs in light of the global governance debate. Section III highlights the
significance of GP liberalization and provides an overview on GPA regulations.
Section IV summarizes EU’s recent FTAs. Section V examines whether
procurement liberalization through FTAs conforms to multilateral provisions,
comments on how commitments by non-GPA member countries provide
momentum to streamline domestic frameworks and foster international
cooperation within the widerWTO architecture. SectionVI concludes by arguing
that the EU employs FTAs to further normative liberalization by transposing GP
4 Gänzle, S., Externalizing EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy: towards a Framework
for Analysis, 61 Europe-Asia J. 1715–1734 (2009); Lavenex, S., A Governance Perspective on the
European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration beyond Conditionality? 15 J. European Pub. Policy 938–955
(2008); Lavenex, S. & Schimmelfennig, F., EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External
Governance in European Politics, 16 J. European Pub. Policy 791–812 (2009).
5 Wunderlich, D., The Limits of External Governance: Implementing EU External Migration Policy, 19
J. European Pub. Policy 1414–1433 (2012).
6 Barbé, E., Costa, O., Herranz Surrallés, A., Natorski, N. Which Rules Shape EU External Governance?
Patterns of Rule Selection in Foreign and Security Policies, 16 J. European Pub. Policy 835–852 (2009).
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rules elsewhere to create momentum for liberalization and to support its pursuit of
a multilateral world.
2 FTAS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE DEBATE
Regionalism has motivated a growing interest in the determinants of FTAs.
Economic rationales include the ease of negotiations amongst fewer partners, the
ability to preclude liberalization in certain sectors,7 to mitigate the fear of ‘losing
out to neighbours’ through trade diversion, and contagion effects generated by
spill-overs.8 Political explanations include the spread of democracy generating new
alliances,9 lack of momentum at the multilateral level, and the quest for
geopolitical stability.10 Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner (1999) propose that
regionalism comes in waves, and Richard Baldwin (1997) argues that the ‘new’
wave arises from domino forces created by 1980s Eurocentric round of preferential
liberalization.11 Current ‘new’ regionalism is ‘deeper’ than traditional trade
agreements,12 with partners willing to negotiate investment, procurement,
competition policy and intellectual property rights issues. Although traditional
models of trade suggest that FTAs between countries which share differences in
comparative advantages makes economic sense, Mansfield et al. argue that political
support may be complicated due to the unequal distribution of factor rewards,
implying ‘good politics drives out good economics’, as agreements between
7 Ravenhill, J., The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific 24 Third World Q. 299–317 (2003).
8 Baldwin, R., A Domino Theory of Regionalism, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London,
Working paper No. 857 (1993).
9 Mansfield, E., Milner, H. & P. Rosendorff, Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political
Regimes and International Trade 96 Am. Political Sci. Rev. 167–169 (2002); Wu, J. P., Measuring and
Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Integration, ZEI Working Paper B12/2004, Centre for
European Integration Studies, Bonn (2004).
10 Mansfield, E. & J. Pevehouse, Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict, 54 Intl. Org.
775–808 (2000); Martin, P., Mayer, T. & M. Thoenig, Make Trade Not War? 75 Rev. Econ. Stud.
865–900 (2008); Martin, P., Mayer, T. & M. Thoenig, The Geography of Conflicts and Free Trade
Agreements, CEPR Discussion Paper 7740 (2010); Vicard, V., Trade, Conflicts and Political Integration:
Explaining the Heterogeneity of Regional Trade Agreements, CES Working Paper 22 (2008).
11 Richard Baldwin, Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that the concurrent rounds of
multilateral negotiations play an important role in motivating this wave of regionalism. See
Mansfield, E., & Milner, H., The New Wave of Regionalism, 53 Intl. Org. 589–627 (1999); Baldwin,
R., The Causes of Regionalism, 20 The World Econ. 865–888 (1997).
12 Baldwin, R., 21st Century Regionalism: Filling the Gap between 21st Century Trade and 20th Century
Trade Rules,WTO Economic Research and Statistics Division. Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-08
(2011). Paper presented at the WTO’s ‘Workshop on PTAs and the WTO: A New Era’; Burfisher,
M., Robinson, S. & Thierfelder, K., Regionalism: Old and New, Theory and Practice, Agricultural
Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are we Heading? Invited paper presented at conference
Capri, 23–26 Jun. 2003; Burfisher, M., Robinson, S. & Thierfelder, K., Regionalism: Old and New,
Theory and Practice, Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are we Heading? Invited
paper presented at conference Capri, 23–26 Jun. 2003.
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countries with similar factor endowments may be politically easier to conclude.13
Furthermore, the presence of ‘appropriate’ governance structures within a country
can, in principle, facilitate the flow of goods and ideas and is often associated with
a more liberal trade stance.14 It is no coincidence, that where those governance
structures are absent, the EU incorporates these into the FTA, as in the case of GP.
An important debate within the literature concerns the compatibility of FTAs
with the WTO regime, which has pitted proponents of FTAs as ‘stumbling
blocks’15 against supporters of the FTAs as ‘stepping stones’ towards global
liberalization thesis.16 The latter has been explained through ‘domino effects’
where outsiders become insiders to FTAs to offset trade diversion effects, thus
changing the domestic constellation of pressures for and against liberalization.17
This rationale is also present in some states’ deliberate abandonment of the WTO,
like the USA’s turn to bilateralism in the 2000s to encourage ‘competitive
liberalization’ amongst partners,18 thus weakening the developing world’s
opposition to liberalization as articulated at the WTO. However, ‘stepping stone’
analyses, focusing on trade effects mainly in goods and some services, have
obviated the matter of the effect of the inclusion of new regulatory issues in FTAs.
This article contributes to this literature by focusing on the latter in the inclusion
of GP regimes in EU’s new FTAs.
13 Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H.V., & Pevehouse, J. C., Democracy, Veto Players and the Depth of Regional
Integration, 31 The World Econ. 67–96, 69 (2008).
14 Within this category of determinants should lie the role of multilateral negotiations in the
formation of new trade agreements as suggested by Mansfield and Reinhardt. These are omitted in
this article as the period under investigation only includes one round of negotiations unlike that
used in E. Mansfield & E. Reinhardt, Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The effect of
GATT/WTO on the formation of Preferential Trade Agreements, 57 Intl. Org. 829–862 (2003).
15 Bhagwati, J., The World Trade System, 48 J. Intl. Affairs 279–285 (1994). Bhagwati, J., Termites in the
Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade (Oxford U. Press 2008). Thurow, L.,
Head to Head:The Coming Battle among Japan, Europe and America (William Morrow 1992).
16 Krugman, P., Regionalism versus Multilateralism: Analytical Notes, in New Dimensions in Regional
Integration (J. de Melo & A. Panagariya eds., Cambridge U. Press 1993); Lamy, P., Stepping Stones or
Stumbling Blocks? The EU’s Approach towards the Problem of Multilateralism v. Regionalism in Trade
Policy’, 25 The World Econ.1399–1413 (2002); Wei, S. & Frankel, J., Can Regional Blocs be a
Stepping Stone to Global Free Trade?: A Political Economy Analysis’, 5 Intl. Rev. Econ. & Fin. 339–347
(1996).
17 Baldwin, R., A Domino Theory of Regionalism, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London,
Working paper No. 857 (1993).
18 Schott, J., Free Trade Agreements and US Trade Policy: A Comparative Analysis of US Initiatives
in Latin America, the Asia-Pacific Region, and the Middle East and North Africa, 20 The Intl.
Trade J. 95–138 (2006).
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3 SIGNIFICANCE OF PROCUREMENT LIBERALIZATION AND
THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Public procurement represents a major economic sector outside the main WTO
regime. Estimates show that public expenditure on goods, works and services in
the EU amounts to over EUR 2 trillion in 2009 (nearly 16% of total EU’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)), and for developing and transition economies, this is
50% of total GDP.19 Public procurement markets remain guarded by national
governments and in some cases politicized.They can be viewed as part of a state’s
developmental policies to direct investment to particular areas or support domestic
sectors. In some instances, public procurement can be vulnerable to corruption
and rent seeking by contracting authorities in countries lacking stable institutions.
Literature on the influence of international commitments on institutional reform
is scarce. However, some studies focusing on procurement mechanisms and their
susceptibility to corruption, suggest that corruption in public contracting activity
reduces efficiency, leads to waste, and creates resistance to reform from vested
interests.20 Within the broader context of international trade, studies report that
ill-functioning institutions impair trade, and increase the costs of trading.21 Dollar
and Kraay report a positive correlation between openness and the quality of
institutions.22 Bolaky and Freund argue that international trade generates benefits
only when liberalization is complemented by educational, regulatory environment,
and other institutional reforms.23 Rodrik suggests that successful institutional
reforms require integrating imported rules and regulations into local institutions.24
Linking trade liberalization and institutions, some scholars argue that liberalization
strengthens institutional frameworks, augments transparency and enhances public
accountability.25 The creation of institutional frameworks within the WTO or
19 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the access of third-country goods and services to the
Union’s internal market in public procurement, COM (2012) 124, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2012/march/tradedoc_149243.pdf (accessed 15 Aug. 2013).
20 Infante, D. & Smirnova, J., Rent Seeking Under a Weak Institutional Environment’, 104 Econ. Letters
118–121 (2009); Cule, M. & Fulton, M., Some Implications of the Unofficial Economy -Bureaucratic
Corruption Relationship in Transition Countries, 18 Econ. Letters 207–211 (2005).
21 Anderson, J. E., Trade and Informal Institutions (mimeo) (2001). Anderson, J. E. & D. Marcouiller,
Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation, 84 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 342–352
(2002).
22 Dollar, D. & Kraay, A., Institutions,Trade and Growth, 50 J. Monetary Econ. 133–162 (2003).
23 Bolaky, B. & Freund, C., Trade, Regulations, and Growth, World Bank Policy Research Paper 3255,
Washington:World Bank (2004).
24 In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth (Rodrik, D. ed., Princeton U. Press
2003).
25 Hood, C. (2001) Transparency, in Encyclopaedia of Democratic Thought 700–705 (P.B. Clarke &
J. Foweraker eds., Routledge 2001); Bastida, F. & Benito, B., Central Government Budget Practices and
Transparency: An International Comparison, 85 Pub. Administration 667–716 (2007); Khorana, S., Kerr,
W. A. & Mishra, N., Piercing the Puzzle of Procurement Liberalization: Case-Study on Vietnam, 41
Policy & Pol. (2013).
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FTAs is informed by these views and aims to create certainty regarding markets
and business opportunities.
The GPA is a plurilateral agreement within the WTO and applies to those
WTO member countries that choose to join its membership. In this regard, it
differs from the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and General
Agreement onTrade in Services (GATS) agreements founding theWTO which all
WTO members must abide by.The WTO system is not directly applicable but its
rules are enforced domestically through mobilization of interests triggered by the
WTO dispute settlement system.26 Although the voluntary GPA is subject to the
state-to-state dispute settlement system, only three requests for panels have been
opened. Of the two opened by the EU, both were resolved by the parties outside
of the appellate body and related to language used in tenders.27 The GPA was
negotiated in parallel to the Uruguay Round, and entered into force on 1 January
1996. It was created with the commitment to facilitate additional Parties’
accession. Renegotiations of an updated GPA, taking account of new
technological developments in procurement and extending the agreement to
further procuring entities, were finalized in December 2011.This is likely to enter
into force in 2013 after ratification by members. Renegotiations introduced
greater flexibility in levels of openness to facilitate developing state accession to
GPA.28 The GPA has forty-two members – thirty-six developed and six
developing countries. Emerging and developing states have dithered over GPA,
due to a failure to see sufficient potential benefits or lack of regulatory
frameworks, and their own use of procurement as a domestic development tool.29
The GPA mandates members to establish an agreed framework for procurement
regulations and procedures, with non-discrimination and national treatment as
core principles that apply to all procurements covered by the Agreement.30 The
GPA includes procurements made by the entities listed by each country in its
26 De Ville, F., European Union Regulatory Politics in the Shadow of the WTO: WTO Rules as Frame of
Reference and Rhetorical Device, 19 J. European Pub. Policy 700–718 (2012).
27 World Trade Org., Dispute settlement under the GPA, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_
e/disput_e.htm (accessed 15 Jul. 2013).
28 Ibid.
29 Developed country members comprise: the European Communities including its twenty-seven
Member States, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Switzerland and the United States. Current developing
country GPA members – Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Israel, Taiwan and Aruba (of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands).
30 This accords ‘no less favourable’ treatment to any other countries’ suppliers than they allow to
their domestic products, services and suppliers (Art. III: 1a) and does not allow for discrimination
among goods, services and suppliers of other Parties (Art. III: 1b). Each member country is
required to ensure that its entities do not treat domestic suppliers differently on the basis of a
greater or lesser degree of foreign affiliation or ownership, and that there is no discrimination
against domestic suppliers because their good or service is produced in the territory of another
Party (Art. III: 2).
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Appendix I Annexes.31 Coverage is defined by: (i) value such that only contracts
that exceed a certain threshold are covered; (ii) identity of the procuring agency,
i.e. only those listed by the parties in the annexes; (iii) type of goods and services;
and (iv) the origin of goods and services covering GPA members.The Agreement
also lists conditions for participation and procedural requirements for suppliers and
procuring entities. Requirements for procurement processes include: (i) the use of
technical specifications; (ii) allowable tendering procedures; (iii) qualification of
suppliers; (iv) invitations to participate in intended procurements; (v) selection
procedures; (vi) time limits for tendering and delivery of documents; (vii) tender
documentation; (viii) submission, receipt and opening of tenders, and the awarding
of contracts; (ix) negotiations by entities with suppliers; and (x) the use of limited
tendering. These intend to ensure that all procurements are conducted in a
transparent and competitive manner. Other features of the GPA are requirements
regarding availability and nature of bid challenge procedures (i.e., domestic review
procedures for products, services and suppliers) and the provision of electronic
bidding. Domestic review procedures aim to provide a framework for supplier
challenges to address either: (i) a breach of the Agreement; or (ii) where a supplier
does not have a right to challenge directly a breach of the Agreement under the
domestic law, a failure to comply with the GPA signatory’s measures implementing
the Agreement. Furthermore, the GPA requires signatories to conduct
procurements ‘in a transparent and impartial manner, and avoid conflicts of interest
and corrupt practices, in accordance with applicable international instruments,
such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption’.32 The GPA involves
processes rather than outcomes, and allows a degree of flexibility. States choose
which entities are exempt from GPA. The European Commission estimates that
only 25% of contestable public procurement markets have been committed
internationally through GPA or FTAs.33 Even GPA members have had their
openness questioned (e.g., EU complaints against USA ‘Buy American’
campaigns).34 Moreover, the voluntary nature of the GPA has remained as
31 Each Party’s Appendix I Annexes specify the entities and threshold value above which individual
procurements are covered by the Agreement. Appendix I includes Annexes such that Annexes 1-3
specify the central and sub-central government entities as well as other entities, such as public
utilities, that each Party has committed to complying with the Agreement. As a general rule, all
goods are covered by the GPA, while Annexes 4 and 5 to Appendix I specify each Party’s covered
services and construction services. Appendix I also include ‘Notes’ and ‘General Notes’ which
qualify the coverage accorded under the Agreement.
32 World Trade Org., Trade Policy Review: report by the EU, WT/TPR/G/248, 20 June 2011, http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g248_e.doc (accessed 17 Jul. 2012).
33 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the access of third-country goods and services to the
Union’s internal market in public procurement, COM (2012) 124, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2012/march/tradedoc_149243.pdf (accessed 15 Aug. 2013).
34 EurActiv (2012), Brussels seeks reciprocity in trade deals, 21 Mar. 2012, http://www.euractiv.com/
innovation-enterprise/brussels-seeks-reciprocity-trade-news-511665 (accessed 10 Jul. 2013).
PROCUREMENT LIBERALIZATION DIFFUSION IN EU AGREEMENTS 487
3
4
developing states blocked attempts to incorporate procurement into the main
corpus of the WTO during the beleaguered Doha Round.35 The USA and EU
have subsequently made the adoption of these issues a key objective of their
FTAs.36
In the European case, a further imperative for the externalization of GP
liberalization derives from the creation of its single market. Since the Single
European Act (1985), the EU has applied a regime of procurement liberalization,
removing preferential treatment of national industry in government purchasing.
Subsequent Directives from 2004 and 2011 have increased liberalization.37
Morton has described this process as dominated by the European Commission’s
promotion of a competition policy agenda demanding the removal of national
barriers to cross-border competition,38 where procurement is examined through
the principles of non-discrimination, competition and transparency.39 As Smith
purports:
As integration of the EC public procurement market proceeded and suppliers enhanced
their abilities to compete for contracts across borders, the European Commission could
soften opposition to the public procurement regime from suppliers who would have to
relinquish privileged relationships with public authorities by creating greater opportunities
for European firms abroad.40
Indeed, the European Commission (as the EU’s international trade
negotiator)41 was a driving force behind the GPA, as once EU states lost the ability
to control GP fostering more markets abroad would be beneficial to EU suppliers,
35 The so-called Singapore issues (investment, competition policy, transparency in public procurement
and trade facilitation) were brought onto the WTO agenda at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial
meeting. Despite EU and USA pressure for their adoption during the Doha Round, resistance
from the developing world and Brazil and India as leaders of the G22 group led to the collapse of
negotiations at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial. It was decided to proceed only with the trade
facilitation negotiations (and the other negotiations on agriculture, non-agricultural market access,
etc.). Negotiations continue slowly ahead of the December 2013 Bali Ministerial.
36 Non-GPA members sometimes include GP in FTAs (e.g., Chile, ANZCERTA between Australia
and New Zealand). See Kim, D., A Study on the Government Procurement Provisions of Korean Free
Trade Agreements: Centering on the Case of Korea-US FTA, Paper presented at the 4th International
Public Procurement Conference in Seoul, 26–28 Aug. 2010, http://www.ippa.org/ippc4_
proceedings9.htm (accessed 1 Jul. 2013).
37 The current legal bases for public procurement in the EU are the revised Directives 2004/17/EC
(procurement in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors) and 2004/18/EC (public
works, supply and service contracts).
38 Morton, A., European Union Public Procurement Law, the Public Sector and Public Service Provision,
European Public Services Briefings No. 4, European Services Strategy Unit (2012).
39 Bovis, C. H., Developing Public Procurement Regulation: Jurisprudence and Its Influence in Law Making’,
43 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 461–495, 461 (2006).
40 Smith, M. P., Single Market, Global Competition: Regulating the European Market in a Global Economy,
17 J. European Pub. Policy 936–956, 948 (2010).
41 The collusive delegation theory of EU trade policy, argues that the institutional set-up isolates the
Commission from protectionist interests and explains its liberalizing stance (see Meunier, S., What
Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations, 54 Intl. Org. 103–135 (2000);
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who already had to adapt internally to a more competitive environment.42 In the
Doha Round, the Commission was a key proponent of the incorporation of
Singapore issues.43 The EU has made attempts to ‘externalize’ its regulatory regime
by encouraging expanded membership of the GPA, and acceptance of
GPA-standard regulations in FTAs. It has extended to the international arena the
same arguments used to justify EU procurement liberalization, such as the claim
that benefits to domestic suppliers of protected markets are offset by increased
procurement costs.44 This logic is now so entrenched in Europe, that discussions
regarding a European Commission proposal for a GP International Initiative
(March 2012), in which the Commission suggested restricting access to EU GP
markets to companies from countries that limit access to EU firms, were objected
on the grounds that this would go against the EU’s GP policies of obtaining best
value for public money.45 Furthermore, concerns were expressed that this would
indirectly legitimize ‘Buy American’ and other campaigns that the EU opposes.46
The problems the EU has encountered in reshaping international GP rules to
its image, and advantage, are summarized in the GP International Initiative: ‘the
EU lacks leverage to foster the globalization of procurement’, especially as the EU
is more open than other GPA partners and has given contracts in areas not covered
by the GPA.47 As the GPA lies beyond the ‘single undertaking’ of negotiations at
theWTO, greater GP market access cannot be traded-off against other issues at the
WTO. Europe’s liberal internal regime, mandating transparency, openness and
opting for the most economically advantageous tender48 weakens the EU’s
possibilities for leveraging its GP market in the GPA, as, legally, procurement
entities cannot retaliate against closed GP markets by excluding their companies’
bids. At the FTA level, however, where the EU can offer concessions on other
Meunier, S. & Nicolaidis, K., Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU, 37
J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 477–510 (1999).
Others argue that positions result from the interplay of interests with exporting industries often
gaining more support (De Bieve, D. & Dür,A., Constituency Interests and Delegation in EU and American
Trade Policy, 38 Comp. Political Stud. 1271–1296 (2005); Dür, A., Bringing Economic Interests Back into
the Study of EUTrade Policy-Making, 10 Brit. J. Pol. & Intl. Rel. 27–45 (2008).
42 Supra., p. 948.
43 Abdewal, R. & Meunier, S., Managed Globalisation: Doctrine, Practice and Promise, 17 J. European Pub.
Policy 350–367 (2010).
44 Supra., pp. 948–949.
45 The UK, Sweden, Czech Republic and Germany as the main exporter in Europe were most vocal
in voicing these concerns.
46 EurActiv, Brussels seeks reciprocity in trade deals 21 Mar. 2012, http://www.euractiv.com/innova
tion-enterprise/brussels-seeks-reciprocity-trade-news-511665 (accessed 10 Jul. 2013).
47 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the access of third-country goods and services to the
Union’s internal market in public procurement, COM (2012) 124, at 2, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2012/march/tradedoc_149243.pdf (accessed 15 Aug. 2013).
48 Morton, A., European Union Public Procurement Law, the public sector and Public Service Provision,
European Public Services Briefings No. 4, European Services Strategy Unit (2012).
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matters to partners in exchange for access to GP markets, the EU stands a better
chance of externalizing its preferred GP regime.
4 MAPPING EU’S RECENT BILATERALTRADE AGREEMENTS
Before the 2000s, EU FTAs followed political motives (development,
rapprochement to neighbours). Current FTAs are driven by a competitiveness
agenda introduced in the ‘Global Europe’ trade policy49 that aims to open markets
and pursue the ‘Singapore issues’.Within this, procurement figures as a new area of
importance with significant untapped potential for EU exporters.50 The recently
concluded EU-Singapore FTA allows EU bidders opportunities in public
tendering, including the utilities sectors for the first time. Both partners have
agreed on transparency and non-discrimination rules extending beyond the realm
of WTO GPA. Other EU agreements include FTA with Korea (in effect), EPAs
with ACP states (EU-CARIFORUM agreement)51 and Association Agreements
(AAs) with Central America and Peru/Colombia (pending implementation).52
The EU is negotiating further FTAs in Asia with India, Malaysia and Vietnam,53
which have been mired by GP discussions. The rapidly growing FTA numbers
with extensive GP chapters make an analysis topical, and subsequent sections
explore the main commitments and approaches in the FTAs already finalized, to
draw lessons for ongoing negotiations.
An analysis of GP chapters in EU FTAs shows provisions mirror the GPA
language, classifications and commitments.Table 1 summarizes EU FTA provisions,
compares these with GPA commitments, and classifies agreements as WTO-plus
49 Woolcock, S., European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements, ECIPE Working Paper 03/2007
(2007).
50 The strategy set out an integrated approach, linking the internal and external aspects of the EU’s
competitiveness. In operational terms, Global Europe’s main innovation was that, while reaffirming
the EU’s commitment to the multilateral system and the Doha Round, it ended the de facto
moratorium on launching new FTAs. The Global Europe strategy applied new economic criteria
to the launch of FTAs, focusing on partners with high market potential (economic size and
growth) and significant economic benefits from removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers (e.g., due
to high existing barriers). As a result, a series of more economically orientated negotiations were
launched with Korea, India and ASEAN in 2007 and Canada in 2009. Negotiations with
Mercosur were re-launched in 2010. See European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the
World, 2006, trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf (accessed 25 Jun.
2013).
51 With the expiry of the WTO waiver, the EU regulated its relations with ACP countries and
allowed for non-reciprocal preferential trade under the Cotonou regime. Timetables for
liberalization are more gradual for the ACP states.
52 The intent varies between agreements, for instance CARIFORUM Agreement aims to alleviate
poverty, promote regional integration and economic cooperation to foster integration into the
global economy (European Commission, 2009). AAs establish a broader cooperation framework on
trade, political, security, economic and human rights.
53 Negotiations began with Japan and Thailand in 2013.
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and WTO-extra depending on the level of commitment undertaken by partners.
This classification borrows the typology developed by Horn et al. in their
comparison of EU and USA FTAs.54 For them WTO-plus categories refer to
inclusion of provisions that are not currently part of the binding corpus of the
WTO, but have been or are being discussed at the WTO (e.g., services
liberalization). WTO-extra refers to provisions completely outside the current
remit of WTO discussions (e.g., non-nuclear proliferation, ILO provisions).
Because GPA is optional at the WTO level, all FTAs containing GP frameworks
are classified asWTO-plus.This category covers provisions that aim for progressive
liberalization and GPA-compliant procurement framework. Whereas WTO-extra
provisions refer to additional liberalization commitments in areas not currently
covered or regulated by theWTO GPA.
Table 1 EUTrade Agreements with Government Procurement Provisions
Date of
Entry
Agreement Type Objective Commitments
undertaken
by Partner
Countries
Nov-08 EU-
CARIFORUM
Economic Partnership
Agreement
Regional
procurement market
liberalization
WTO-plus
May-10 EU-Central
America
Association Agreement Effective, reciprocal
and gradual opening
of respective
procurement
markets
WTO-plus
Jan-10 EU-Latin
America
Association Agreement Effective and
reciprocal opening
of government
procurement
markets of the
Parties
WTO-plus
Jul-11 EU-Korea FTA Mutual liberalization WTO-extra
Source:Authors’ compilation.
54 Horn, H., Mavroidis, P. & Sapir, A., Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of US and EU Preferential Trade
Agreements’, Bruegel Blueprint, Brussels, 2009, http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-
detail/publication/238-beyond-the-wto-an-anatomy-of-eu-and-us-preferential-trade-agreements/
(accessed 27 Aug. 2013).
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The table shows that all agreements emphasize liberalization as FTAs ‘are
important for the EU to benefit from growth in fast-growing markets in the
medium-to long term and that these contribute to solving the most systemic trade
barriers in government procurement’.55 In WTO-plus agreements, the explicit
acknowledgement of procurement liberalization significance with a separate
chapter on related taxonomies is a common theme. These focus on key GPA
elements, i.e. non-discrimination and national treatment, general institutional
improvements through procedural reforms, including electronic publication of
planned procurements to enhance transparency. In doing so, FTAs aspire to employ
trading obligations as a reform vehicle to revamp partners’ national procurement
systems, and to ‘externalize’ EU’s model. The WTO-extra commitments in
EU-Korea FTA include Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) commitments, which
extend the scope of GPA coverage beyond conventional goods, services and
construction. Commitments additionally apply to local governments in Seoul,
Busan, Incheon and Gyonggi-do, besides entities covered under the GPA.56
5 DO EU FTAS FACILITATE A MODEL FOR MULTILATERAL
PROCUREMENT LIBERALIZATION?
Transmission and adoption of multilateral rules is a core feature of EU FTAs (e.g.,
international car standards and ILO labour provisions in EU-Korea FTA). Europe’s
multilateral vocation has become a legal requirement in its external action under
Article 21(1) of the Lisbon Treaty (2008) which obliges the EU to ‘promote
multilateral solutions to common problems’. Renard (2012) justifies this
multilateral commitment because if a new global order were to emerge outside a
multilateral framework, the EU risks having little weight in international
negotiations.57 Procurement liberalization by the EU through FTAs is analogous
with its perspective that deep FTAs will support developing countries to cope
with complex multilateral negotiations, and that convergence achieved through
55 European Commission, International Affairs: Free Trade Agreements, Brussels, 11 July 2011, http://ec.
europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/facilitating-trade/free-trade/index_en.htm (accessed 17
Aug. 2013).
56 The USA-Korea FTA also does not extend Korean GP coverage beyond that in the GPA. See
Kim, D., A Study on the Government Procurement Provisions of Korean Free Trade Agreements: Centering
on the Case of Korea-US FTA’, Paper presented at the 4th International Public Procurement
Conference in Seoul, 26–28 Aug. 2010, http://www.ippa.org/ippc4_proceedings9.htm (accessed 1
Jul. 2013).
57 Renard, T., The EU Strategic Partnerships Review:Ten Guiding Principles’, FRIDE Policy Brief 2, 2012
(available at http://www.fride.org/publication/1011/the-eu-strategic-partnerships-review:-ten-gui
ding-principles).
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such agreements will foster multilateral cooperation on procurement.58 This finds
resonance in Medvedev’s (2010) work, which sees bilateral agreements as
opportunities to lock-in domestic reforms and stepping stones to deep integration
including trade in procurement, services, investment, and labour mobility.59 In this
manner, the EU’s agreements provide a means to pursue mutual economic
interests, address political tensions and pave the way for collective voice.60 Grevi
and Khandekar (2012) comment that the EU’s overlapping bilateral partnerships
constitute a ‘smart grid’ for global politics that will enable it to connect with
countries that may not be global powers but perform a lynchpin role.61 Gratius
(2011) argues that, although hard to achieve, bilateral partnerships narrow
differences and support developing joint initiatives in multilateral settings,
particularly where some partners play an increasingly important role at the
regional level.62 Earlier literature agrees that bilateral agreements do foster
multilateral convergence if integrated regions adopt provisions similar to theWTO
rules.63 The European Commission (2010) articulates its view that EU’s motives
for pursuing procurement liberalization through FTAs are ‘not limited to
additional market access but using these as a stepping stone for progressive
liberalization in partner countries’.64
An analysis of the FTAs demonstrates conformity between commitments and
GPA provisions. In line with GPA provisions, EU FTAs make specific reference to
non-discrimination and the GPA language applies.The coverage of goods, services
and construction services as well as entities by non-GPA countries in Latin
America, follow the GPA model so that all goods are covered unless specifically
58 European Commission, Report on progress achieved on the Global Europe strategy, 2006-2010,
Commission Staff Working document, SEC(2010) 1268/2 (Brussels), 2010, http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146941.pdf (accessed 25 Jun. 2013).
59 Medvedev, D., Preferential Trade Agreements and Their Role in World Trade, 146 Rev. World Econ.
199–222 (2010).
60 Renard, T., The EU Strategic Partnerships Review: Ten Guiding Principles, FRIDE Policy Brief 2,
2012 (available at http://www.fride.org/publication/1011/the-eu-strategic-partnerships-review:-ten-
guiding-principles).
61 Grevi, G. & G. Khandekar, Why EU Strategic Partnerships matter? working paper No. 1, European
Strategic Partnerships Observatory, FRIDE, Egmont (2012).
62 Gratius, S., Can EU Strategic Partnerships Deepen Multilateralism? Working paper No. 109, September,
European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, FRIDE, Egmont (2011).
63 Zahrnt, V., How Regionalisation Can Be a Pillar of a More Effective World Trade Organization’, 39
J. World Trade 671–699 (2005); Lamy, P. (2006) speech dated 17 Oct. 2006 to the European
Parliament’s International Trade Committee, where he warned that the Doha failure will seriously
weaken the trading system, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl44_e.htm (accessed 30
Aug. 2013).
64 European Commission, Report on progress achieved on the Global Europe strategy, 2006-2010,
Commission Staff Working document, SEC(2010) 1268/2 (Brussels), 2010, http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146941.pdf (accessed 25 Jun. 2013); see also Zahrnt,
V., How Regionalisation can be a Pillar of a More Effective World Trade Organization, 39 J. World Trade
671–699 (2005).
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excluded.There are detailed coverage commitments in annexes, detailing central,
sub-central and other entities covered. The EU-Peru/Colombia and EU-Central
American agreements incorporate comprehensive entity coverage, with entities
listed positively, but goods and services follow a negative list, i.e., those not
mentioned are subject to liberalization commitments. However, in
EU-Peru/Colombia all universal services and construction services covered are
listed in a positive manner. The proximity of FTA with GPA regulations
emphasizes the aims of future convergence – for Latin American countries, the
agreement subdivides listings into A and B (Panama’s list also has C category) for
annex three entities, i.e., ‘other entities’ for which differing threshold values apply,
allowing the specified entities to increase competitiveness over time. Similarly,
EU-CARIFORUM agreement limits coverage to central government entities
only.An important point is that although the level of liberalization and coverage of
entities varies between countries, commitments at the bilateral level are primarily
driven by identifying sectors that constitute a competitive challenge and
strengthening these over time.
All FTAs scrutinized allow procurement thresholds to vary, with higher initial
thresholds reducing over time for non-GPA members. This flexible approach
illustrates the emphasis on conformity with GPA thresholds over the longer term.
For instance, Peru adheres to GPA threshold values for sub-central governments,
while Colombia commits to an initial value double that for the GPA indicative of
partner countries’ aspiration to progressively work towards being able to upgrade
from its observer status at the GPA to membership. Similarly, under the
EU-Central America agreement, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras
propose to work down towards GPA threshold values over specified periods from
higher thresholds to GPA norms. The level of GPA conformity for construction
services is particularly striking while thresholds for services are split into two
categories. Under annex II, Central America states maintain higher threshold value
than that of the GPA; while annex III lists all countries into categories (B and C in
the case of Panama) referring to sub-government level agencies, conforms to the
GPA threshold value for goods and services and list A is half the GPA value.
Guatemala utilizes an approach that allows working down to GPA thresholds
incrementally. This suggests that the EU aims to generate momentum in partner
countries to streamline procurement frameworks and achieve GPA-compliant
thresholds, and is consistent with the EU’s understanding of multilateralism which
includes ‘helping other countries to implement and abide by [international]
rules’.65 This will eventually facilitate procurement liberalization at the multilateral
65 European Commission, Communication on the EU and the UN: The Choice of Multilateralism,
COM (2003) 526 final.
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level. The EU-Korea FTA resonates the intention of additional liberalization by
extending Korea’s coverage of entities beyond those listed under the GPA. Korea
though retains threshold values for contracts for new sub-government level entities
that are three times higher than those of the EU (SDR 15,000,000).
EU FTAs export GPA provisions on tendering modalities and procedures.
Supplier qualification guidelines, modelled after the GPA, aim to prevent
discrimination, focus on clarity in technical specifications and a commitment to
fair competition for tendering. All agreements require technical specifications in
terms of performance rather than design, and based on international standards,
where they exist, or, otherwise, on national technical regulations, recognized
national standards, or building codes, as required by the GPA. Provisions on
suppliers’ qualification are closely aligned with the GPA, i.e., maintaining suppliers’
lists, and that a notice inviting all interested suppliers to apply for inclusion is
published annually. Finally, all FTAs follow GPA requirements on time limit
provisions for foreign suppliers to prepare and submit bids for participation.
Further in line with the GPA, open tendering is treated as the ‘base case’, with
the use of selective and limited tendering subject to special rules and conditions to
preserve transparency and competition to the extent possible. All agreements
require purchasing entities to invite tenders from a maximum number of foreign
suppliers and ensure that conditions for supplier qualification do not discriminate
against these.The FTAs also include safeguards to ensure that negotiations do not
discriminate between suppliers.With regards to negotiations, similar preconditions
as specified in the GPA apply where entities can negotiate with suppliers provided
this is indicated in the initial tender notice or if it appears from the tender
evaluation that no one tender is the most advantageous.
The FTAs also list derogations to services procured by entities with regards to
commitments and domestic policy issues in appendix I. Services exempt within
EU-Central America agreement are research and development, education and
health services. Additional derogations for electricity distribution are listed by
Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama. Exceptionally El Salvador has not listed
derogations. Sector specific derogations are also listed under the
EU-Peru/Colombia for agricultural products in the cases of agricultural support
and food assistance programmes, procurement of goods for army and police.
Beverage and tobacco products, textiles, apparel and leather products, live animals,
are also listed under derogations negotiated. An example with regards to domestic
policy considerations includes the condition relating to the hiring of local
personnel in rural areas to promote employment and improve conditions in the
EU-Peru/Colombia agreement. The EU-CARIFORUM agreement allows
exceptions for a range of government activities not subject to competition. The
inclusion of such derogations addresses the issue that developing countries set aside
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policies for favoured sectors or groups, which is always a contentious matter at the
multilateral level.
An important innovation of these FTAs is the introduction of comprehensive
and non-discriminatory review procedures to enable suppliers to challenge the
tender award.The degree of depth varies between agreements though all provide
an impartial administrative authority for the review of challenge.The EU-Central
America and EU-Peru/Colombia agreements are particularly detailed and provide
information on bid challenge modalities, hinting at the willingness of partners to
have bid challenge mechanisms to GPA-standard. The FTAs also contain dispute
settlement provisions as separate chapters – there is an exhaustive treatment of
arbitration, and the EU-Central America agreement includes provisions on
temporary remedies. The most novel are the guidelines on temporary remedies
that outline situations where the country complained against failures to notify
measures taken to comply earlier than the expiry of the reasonable time period.
The EU-Peru/Colombia agreement requires countries to establish timely, effective
and transparent review procedure as well as provide for interim measures to ensure
suppliers are able to participate in the procurement.This agreement also requires
the partners to provide suppliers with decisions, and, upon request, provide
unsuccessful suppliers with reasons for non-selection, in line with the GPA.
The FTA provisions on transparency follow the GPA with detailed guidance,
and focus on publishing information of notice for procurements, providing
information to suppliers on award decisions, and on request providing unsuccessful
suppliers with reasons for non-selection. The only exception is when this may
prejudice fair competition between suppliers. All agreements, except the
EU-CARIFORUM EPA, specifically mention e-procurement and electronic
auctions. The EU-Central America agreement highlights electronic auction
procurements and requires the entities to provide participants with automatic
evaluation methods.
Like the GPA, all FTAs provide for cooperation through formalized
institutional arrangements. The Latin American agreements require countries to
establish a committee to meet once a year or upon written request.The EU-Korea
FTA establishes a working group to consider issues on government procurement
and on any other issues related to the implementation of this Chapter. In the
EU-CARIFORUM, decisions on the application or extension of the procurement
rules are to be made by the Joint CARIFORUM – EC Council.With regards to
technical cooperation and assistance, the CARIFORUM EPA reflects the
aspiration of countries to liberalize regional procurement with support from the
EU, through exchanges of experience, the establishment of appropriate systems to
ensure compliance and the creation of an online facility at a regional level.
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In summary, the agreements concluded by the EU with non-GPA signatories
are closely aligned with the GPA and include procedural and substantive provisions
on e-procurement and transparency. In cases where the legal framework varies
from liberalization commitments through the FTA, partner countries are required
to make changes to their existing procurement framework. Commitments allow
higher initial procurement threshold values, restrictive entities coverage, and
provide for a transition period to implement obligations are in line with the
harmonized approach based on GPA-style obligations. In this manner, agreements
provide momentum to streamline legal procurement frameworks in partner
countries and promote competition and transparency. Thus, FTAs offer an
opportunity for multilateral convergence, given that a common liberalization
matrix will support reducing divergences with partners and within the multilateral
system. Explicit GPA-style binding obligations can be a learning process for
non-GPA countries, which will create a feeling of ‘ownership of rules’ before these
make any firm commitment to the GPA. Colombia’s application for observer
status to the WTO GPA can, thus, be construed as an implicit expression to test
liberalization on a smaller scale before committing to multilateral liberalization.
The argument for phased approach to procurement liberalization under FTAs is
also relevant given the added benefits of reduced transaction costs for developing
countries negotiating future GPA accession. In the short term, bilateral agreements
reflect the willingness of partner countries to liberalize procurements. In the
longer term, the overall approach to liberalization hints at an implicit and ‘soft
commitment’ undertaking approach which aims to explore future GPA accession
by bridging traditionally distant agendas between countries.To date, however these
partners have chosen to remain outside the GPA, even though they will apply the
bulk of the GPA with relation to the EU, and the USA, which also included
similar provisions in its FTAs with the region. This hints at a reluctance to
liberalize GP which is only overcome when it is used as a bargaining chip to gain
concessions on other matters in negotiations – something not possible within the
current GPA.
6 EU’S GLOBAL GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR PROCUREMENT:
CONCLUDINGTHOUGHTS
The rationale extended for the pursuit of bilateral agreements by the EU is that
structured partnerships facilitate mutual understanding and rapprochement, boost
multilateral efforts and allow partners to address shared concerns on global
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challenges.66 Within this context, EU FTAs can be seen as a stepping stone for
multilateral procurement liberalization in that the agreements have GPA-style
provisions with all partners. It is likely that a similar situation could emerge, as
what developed within the EU, such that adaptation to the FTA GP regime alters
partners’ opposition to liberalizing GP multilaterally as once the rules have been
adapted at a bilateral level, costs of joining the GPA are reduced.
Proximity between the GPA and EU’s recently concluded FTAs suggests the
EU could use its ‘new generation’ FTAs for possible incremental extension of the
multilateral system in the longer term. In doing so, the EU is likely to play a key
role in establishing a framework for global governance, which is in line with
Europe’s post 2006 FTAs strategy of WTO-plus agreements. An underlying
emphasis of FTAs has been to enhance transparency in partner countries, which
also demonstrates the effectiveness of FTAs as a transmitter of multilateral rules
beyond the immediate EU neighbourhood.Transmission, however, has been easier
with some partners like South Korea, which share the commitment to liberalize in
addition to the WTO GPA. Further, the ‘external governance’ suggestion that the
alignment with EU policy preferences, or, acceptance of the legitimacy of rules to
be exported, are significant in garnering acquiescence for these, are supported by
these findings. Nonetheless, where partners did not share those views (e.g.,
CARIFORUM), ‘external governance’ and acquiescence to EU demands resulted
from asymmetric power and domestic factors. In the case of CARIFORUM states
that were concerned with the loss of trade preferences in the EU, resulting from
the expiration of the WTO waiver for the EU’s development policy, have sought
an FTA with the EU. Moreover, their calculation was that a willingness to sign a
comprehensive agreement and do so before other EPA groupings was a trade-off
for other commitments from the EU, especially preferential access to European
Development Fund and Aid for Trade budget.67 Thus, issue-linkage and
conditionality are facilitating factors in ‘external governance’ and norm
transmission in the absence of shared partners’ commitments to liberalization.
Additionally, the codification of commitments through FTAs provides a critical
leverage for common actions that are compatible and conducive to stronger
multilateral cooperation.68 Incentives and trade-offs are, therefore, important
factors in individual states’ decisions to participate in multilateral cooperation, and
the GPA allows these through special and differential treatment provisions to
developing countries.
66 Grevi, G. & G. Khandekar, Why EU Strategic Partnerships matter? working paper No. 1, European
Strategic Partnerships Observatory, FRIDE, Egmont (2012).
67 Heron, T., Asymmetric Bargaining and Development Trade-Offs in the CARIFORUM-EU Economic
Partnership Agreement 18 Rev. Intl. Political Econ. 328–357 (2011).
68 Supra.
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The recent successful completion of GPA-compliant FTAs between EU and
partner countries suggests that the EU could employ bilateral relations as an
engine to harmonize FTAs with the plurilateral GPA, which has few developing
countries members, for deeper cooperation and eventually take a lead in defining a
roadmap for global governance.While EU’s trade policy recognizes that Doha talks
have been gridlocked, it also demonstrates the commitment to ‘channel efforts into
mapping a clearer long-term design for global governance’.69 From the EU’s
perspective, FTAs gradually extend its preferred long-term governance design and
guarantee market access for its firms. Assuming that the EU can include similar
provisions in ongoing negotiations with India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Japan and
Thailand, this will lay the ground for future GPA membership by these countries
and will also provide EU firms access to larger markets under a consistent set of
conditions. Furthermore, the flexibility that the EU was willing to concede to the
smaller economies of Latin America is likely to provide a model for future
negotiations with other developing countries in Asia. In the EU-CARIFORUM
EPA, DG Trade stressed the importance it attaches to GP market opening as a
principle. Given the asymmetry in the relationship, acquiescence was easier.
Moreover, the EU accepted exceptions given the limited size of the
CARIFORUM GP market, where most procurements are likely to be below
threshold values. In negotiations with larger emerging economies, there is less
incentive to merely apply the principle. Delays and deadlocks in the negotiations
with India, in part due to lack of agreement on extent of GP liberalization,70
confirms that the EU wants to guarantee its firms’ access to larger markets.
However, strong opposition from Asian partners to GP liberalization means that
the EU may have to resort to flexibility and dilute its aspirations to conclude an
agreement.
To conclude, bilateral cooperation can be a viable formula to strengthen EU’s
effective multilateralism approach. As Grevi contends ‘bilateral and multilateral
frameworks should be seen as connected and not as alternative levels of
engagement in building a new international order’.71 The EU FTAs can, thus, be
employed as an alternate vector for engagement at the inter-regional level to
support the EU’s role as a global actor shaping a functioning multilateral order.
Progress, however, depends on the political will of partner counties to open
dialogue on controversial issues including the principles of sovereignty and
non-interference.
69 Solbes, P. & R.Youngs, Europe Is Failing to Shape the Global Governance Debate Europe’s World 8–12
(2011).
70 Khorana, S. & Garcia, M., EU-India Free Trade Agreement: One Step Forward, One Back? 51 J. Com.
Mkt. Stud. 274–300 (2013).
71 Grevi, G., Why European Strategic Partnerships Matter,Working Paper: 1, FRIDE (2012).
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